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1. Background 
The Interactive Television Research Institute is an independent non-profit 
interdisciplinary research centre based at Murdoch University in Perth, Western 
Australia.  Our clients and research partners are global in character and include many 
of the world’s leading advertising brands and media platforms.  Such clients include 
global leaders in the deployment of digital services including British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB), the BBC, DirecTV, Turner Broadcasting, ESPN and the 
American Broadcasting Company.  Collectively, our advertising clients account for 
approximately a third of the US television ad spend.  Many now view the Institute as 
providing one of the world’s leading research centre’s in study of consumer behaviour 
associated with the evolving digital television industry. 
 
Despite our global focus, we have maintained an active research agenda on issues 
specific to the Australian market.  Recently, for example, we completed a three year 
study exploring how pre-school aged children respond to interactive television 
applications.  This ARC funded project (in collaboration with the WA Department of 
Education, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Nickelodeon and the Nine 
Network) has seen over 500 children participate in research conducted in our Portable 
Audience Research Centre (PARC) – a portable lab housed in a caravan which visited 
21 schools.  We have also engaged in a number of studies exploring consumer 
responses to a wide range of digital TV applications.  In terms of issues associated 
with Australia’s digital policy, we remain active participants and have engaged in a 
number of policy studies – indeed, the ‘beauty pagent’ datacasting option put forth by 
the Australian Democrats was based, in part, on our submission to the Datacasting 
Review in advance of the 2000 legislation.  In 2002 we also conducted a survey of the 
digital TV industry for the then Australian Broadcasting Authority.  Currently, we 
maintain a panel of 3000 viewers who participate in our various studies on a regular 
basis. 
 
The Institute collaborates with researchers throughout Australia and the world 
attracting significant funding from its industry partners as well as from the 
Australasian Cooperative Research Centre for Interaction Design (ACID) and from 
ARC grants. To date the Institute has attracted over $5 million towards such research.  
ITRI researchers also present research findings at major industry conferences 
throughout the United States, Europe, Africa and Australasia. 
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The Institute’s research facilities provide dedicated infrastructure for the study of 
interactive television viewing.  Our labs on the Murdoch campus provides mock 
living rooms simulating the in-home experience of viewers.  In this environment we 
test digital TV content – usually using research methods reflecting experimental 
design so as to compare linear and interactive approaches in a controlled environment 
where variables can be properly isolated.  The lab’s infrastructure includes a reference 
digital head end designed to modulate across satellite, cable and terrestrial platforms; 
and advanced audience measurement tools including eye gaze monitoring (mapping 
viewer eye movement over the TV screen), biometric measurement tools (including 
galvanic skin response) and perception analysers to map viewer’s moment-by-
moment perceptions. 
 
2. Submission to the House Committee Inquiry 
In May, 2005, the Institute made a submission to the House of Representative’s 
Standing Committee on Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 
Inquiry into the Uptake of Digital Television in Australia (“Digital Television - 
Who’s Buying It?”).  In that submission, we argued that Australia’s digital conversion 
policy to date has failed to deliver on its original objectives and that it has largely 
defaulted into a policy protecting the status quo.  The approach has reflected a series 
of concessions designed to appease particular segments of the industry – resulting in 
the cobbling together of a ‘lose-lose’ montage – penalising one market actor to 
compensate for the fact that another has been disadvantaged in some way.  Such an 
approach, based on assuring mutual disadvantage, clearly fails to respond to consumer 
demand, inhibiting innovation and chilling market investment.   
 
The submission highlights key failures of the policy to date including an 
unwillingness to correct the overly restrictive datacasting genre regime following 
clear market failure in the wake of the collapse of the datacasting auction; the lack of 
competitive tension (the policy envisioned significant competition between 
established and new broadcasters which never materialised due to the overly 
restrictive datacasting restrictions); the absence of any meaningful interactive 
services; the lack of a backchannel and integrated platform; the absence of mandatory 
standards across a wide range of issues including receiver standards; constraints 
which have limited the capacity of national broadcasters to provide the market with 
innovative services; and the lack of clear consumer incentives and drivers to stimulate 
digital take up. 
 
The submission concluded with a series of recommendations including the adoption 
of mandatory standards, the articulation of a digital TV action plan, the release of 
spectrum for two new digital channels in each market, one of which would play the 
role of platform integrator/datacaster and the other of which would constitute a digital 
only 4
th network, and to maximise flexibility for spectrum use (including allowance 
for multichanneling).   
 
The focus of the submission was primarily to voice our concern that the existing 
policy would fail to meet its objectives by the 2008 target date.  Rather than reiterate 
these again, we have included a copy of our submission as Appendix ‘A’.  A copy of 
the testimony of ITRI’s Director, Professor Duane Varan, at the Committee hearings 
held at the Institute is also available at 
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3. Moving Forward 
Throughout the course of the past year, Minister Helen Coonan has repeatedly made 
comments highlighting the unique nature of the current juncture.  At her address to 
the National Press Club on August 31
st, 2005, for example, she referenced Cosser’s 
observation that the current opportunity was akin to the building of the railroads in the 
1900s – an opportunity that is ‘not going to come along again.’
1  Her address to the 
inaugural ACMA conference highlighted her views that the interests of consumers are 
the end game translating into a need for new services and diversity.
2  More recently, 
in commenting on the release of the current discussion paper she noted:  
 
This changing landscape means it is timely for the Government to 
review its approach to media regulation and provides an opportunity 
to develop a strategic framework for media reform in Australia that 
truly brings us in to the digital age.
3 
 
We commend the Minister’s vision in this regard.  Clearly, if digital conversion is to 
be facilitated in the immediate future, a change of course is critical.  In this context, 
we believe the measure to push back digital conversion to 2011-12 is prudent.  
Although we would have favoured a more aggressive approach to stimulating take up, 
we believe that proposed reforms provide a cautious approach which may yet prove to 
stimulate conversion against the newly proposed timeline.  We caution, however, that 
for a 2012 end of simulcast to be met, it will be critical to meet key conversion 
milestones along the way.  In this context, we would recommend further reforms 
should automatically trigger should the take up rate fall short. 
 
4. Forecasting Digital Take Up 
To explore the possible ramifications of the proposed policy we constructed a Bass 
diffusion model providing a forecast of digital take up going into the future based on 
Digital Broadcasting Australia’s (DBA) data on take up to date (see figure 1).  We 
caution that we cannot verify the degree to which the DBA accurately reflects market 
penetration but have used the DBA data as it is the only dataset we know of providing 
detailed year-by-year estimates through the end of 2005. As can be seen by DBA’s 
data, the rate of digital take up has accelerated dramatically in the past year in 
particular.  This may be the result of the dramatic decrease in set top box which are 
now available for as low as $85.   
 
On the basis of our Bass diffusion model forecast, other things being equal, the 
current take up trajectory should facilitate analogue switch-off by 2012.  This 
assumes, however, that current market forces will continue to influence take up.  It is 
possible, for example, that the current take up reflects a disproportionately high 
number of adopters who purchased digital receivers so as to improve poor reception.  
The ACMA 2005 Digital Media in Australian Homes survey found that 51% of 
adopters indicated improved reception and better picture as their primary motive in 
adoption.
4  There could be saturation effects associated with diffusion among 
                                                 
1   Address by Senator Coonan to the National Press Club “The New Multimedia World”, August 31, 2005. 
2   Opening address by Senator Coonan at the ACMA Broadcasting Conference, Canberra, November 9, 2005. 
3   Address by Senator Coonan to CEDA “Meeting the Digital Challenge: Reforming Australia’s Media in the 
Digital Age”, Sydney, March 14, 2006. 
4   Loncar, T, Fairbrother, P and Daiziel, J. (2005).  Digital Media in Australian Homes.  Australian 
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households with poor reception that will limit the extent to which the existing 
trajectory continues. 
 
In this context, the proposed reforms (liberalisation of restrictions on national 
broadcasters, no longer requiring HD-SD simulcast resulting in a defacto 
multichannel, potential datacasting services, etc.) may counter potential deceleration.  
Likewise, the reforms may further stimulate take up.  On this basis we believe this 
trajectory can be used as a baseline against which digital penetration can be assessed.  
If the trajectory can be maintained, analogue switch-off in 2012 appears viable.  This 
would result in a take-up of approximately 65% by June, 2008 and almost full 
conversion by 2010 allowing the final two years to focus on a strategy to reach 
diffusion laggards. 
 
We have also attempted to provide a model assuming an 80% take up by 2012 so as to 
articulate a policy sentiment gap at key milestones.  On this basis, a 6% shortfall in 
2008 (59% take up) should signal warning lights indicating that the 2012 digital 
conversion deadline will not be met, other things being equal. 
 
We recommend, on this basis, that the policy set automatic triggers for policy 
intervention in 2008 if take up is below 65% and in 2010 if take up is below 80% 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1): Bass Diffusion Model illustrating current trajectory of digital take up as 
well as alternative model assuming 80% take up in 2012.   
 
We recommend further that such intervention be facilitated at two levels.  If the take 
up by 2008 is at 65% or greater, we would view this as an indicator that the policy is 
on track to deliver analogue switch-off on schedule in 2012.  We refer to this as the 
‘optimal trend’.  If in 2008 such take up is between 55% and 65%, (our critical 
marker is actually 59%) then  some form of intervention will be required to accelerate 
take up.  This constitutes our proposed ‘moderate intervention trend’. If, however, 
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to dramatically correct the trend as the policy is at high risk of failing to stimulate 
digital take up.  We will refer to this final scenario as the ‘aggressive intervention 
trend’.   
 
We will explore potential remedies which might be triggered at each of these critical 
thresholds later in the submission. 
 
5. Balancing Broadcaster vs. Consumer Interests 
At the outset, we think it is important to comment on consumer interests associated 
with adoption.  Throughout the nine year history of digital television in Australia, 
successive ministers have articulated a need to balance between broadcaster and 
consumer interests.  Minister Alston, for example, repeatedly highlighted the degree 
to which “ordinary Australian must be given a compelling reason to buy a new 
television set or a new set top box.”
5   Providing better pictures and sound was never 
seen as being compelling enough, in their own right, to stimulate conversion. As 
Minister Alston explained, “But at the end of the day, I don't think you'd buy it just 
for that (picture clarity), you'd buy it because of the enhancement and the 
datacasting…”
6  And again: “Well look I think your point is valid in the sense that 
people, at the end of the day, want a greater range of choice of programs, rather than 
just simply wanting pretty pictures.”
7  Minister Alston even cautioned against over-
regulation cautioning that: “We must also avoid placing impediments on new and 
exciting technologies, denying consumers access to these services by imposing a 
regulatory regime that artificially constricts the development of the industry.”
8 
 
It is important to also note that the advent of digital television in Australia was 
supposed to bring with it a host of new digital players designed to stimulate consumer 
uptake.  Minister Alston asserted: “'The Government is confident that its decisions 
will ensure that Australians enjoy the best broadcasting in the world while introducing 
new information and entertainment options through the establishment of a thriving 
and viable datacasting industry.” 
9 Alston recognised three keys pillars to the digital 
equation: “The Government's objective is to ensure that the transition to digital TV is 
as smooth as possible for consumers and, at the same time, provides the right balance 
between new and existing players.”
10  Yet it has been the interests of broadcasters, 
almost exclusively, that have proven to be the central focus on the policy to date. 
 
The 1998 and 2000 digital conversion legislation recognised that existing broadcasters 
would need incentives to invest in digital infrastructure.  For this reason, broadcasters 
were awarded certain concessions including the 4
th network moratorium through the 
end of 2006, the datacasting genre restrictions, the free loaning of digital spectrum 
and the like.  We would argue that the necessary incentives have now been delivered 
to existing broadcasters.  Indeed, such broadcasters have even received a bonus in the 
form of the absence of new competitors (datacasters) despite legislation requiring it.  
                                                 
5   Press release: “Success of Digital TV Will Rely on Consumer Choice”, June 30, 2000. 
6   Remarks by Senator the Hon. Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, IT & the Arts, to Radio 2UE 
Drive, 21 December, 1999 
7   ibid 
8   Remarks by Senator the Hon. Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, IT & the Arts, to the Annual 
General Meeting of the Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations, 25 August, 1999. 
9   Press Release “Digital: New Choices, Better Services for Australians’, 21 December, 1999. 
10   Remarks by Senator the Hon. Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, IT & the Arts, to the Digital 
Revolution Conference hosted by Gilbert and Tobin, June 14th 2000. Submission of the Interactive Television Research Institute  Page 6 
 
In this sense, the public has paid its debt… broadcasters have been given their fair go.  
In the path moving forward, the interests of consumers – who have been short-
changed in this equation – should now prevail. 
 
Accordingly, the question we raise is why the proposed policy framework continues 
to protect the interests of broadcasters above those of consumers?  Clearly, consumers 
favour more content choice.  The experience globally has demonstrated that such 
additional content is the main driver to digital uptake.  Our 2002 survey soliciting the 
views of almost a third of those working in the digital television sector in Australia 
found that even the industry itself viewed multichannelling as the strongest driver.
11  
Yet in Australia, both the advent of a fourth ‘digital only’ network and of 
multichannelling are prohibited.  
 
A key contradiction in the proposed framework, we believe, is that many of the most 
compelling ‘drivers’ for digital uptake, from the consumer’s perspective, are 
provisioned for the end of the simulcast period.  In this sense they appear out of 
sequence.  
 
There is another flaw in the ‘driver following switchover’ argument… it provides 
clear incentive to stunt rather than champion digital conversion.  Why should 
broadcasters stimulate take up when the end result is the introduction of greater 
competition?  We believe that the policy acts as a disincentive rather than a stimulant.   
 
This, we believe, justifies the automatic triggers we are proposing.  If market trends 
fail to grow at an adequate pace or if market sentiment fails to respond to the 
proposed incentives and stimulators, then consumer drivers should be triggered so that 
consumer interests can better shape digital take up. 
 
5. The ITRI Survey (2006) 
To help further explore the potential policy implications associated with the proposed 
framework, the Institute conducted a survey drawing from members in its TV Panel.  
This panel consists of 3000 viewers recruited to participate in ITRI’s on-going 
research.  Most of these panellists were recruited through newspaper ads and direct 
mail initiatives although a substantial portion were recruited through a local market 
research firm.   
 
For the purpose of this research, panel members were surveyed to solicit their views 
on a range of issues associated with digital conversion.  Sample boosting for key 
variables (owners of digital receivers, owners of high definition receivers) helped 
provide adequate cell sizes for analysis.  Unfortunately, the short time frame between 
the release of the discussion paper (March 14, 2006) and the closing date for 
submissions (April 18, 2006) made it impractical for us to provide final findings, as 
the research is still in progress.  However, we are happy to provide the Department 
with preliminary findings based on completion of the first 662 respondents.  This 
represents an approximate statistical error rate of plus or minus 4%.  We also 
weighted the observations in our sample so that the percentage of high definition DTT 
receivers (3.7%), standard definition DTT receivers (13%) and Pay TV subscribers 
(24%) exactly matched the actual percentages for penetration in Australia (DTT 
                                                 
11   Varan, D & Morrison, T (2003). Digital Television in Australia: 2002 Industry Survey, Australian 
Broadcasting Authority. Submission of the Interactive Television Research Institute  Page 7 
 
receiver estimates were based on the 2005 ACMA “Digital Media in Australian 
Homes” survey).
12 It should be noted that as the TV Panellists are drawn exclusively 
from the Perth metro area, the sample is not nationally representative.  Nonetheless, 
some interesting trends emerge. 
 
We presented the respondents with a range of hypothetical scenarios associated with 
potential digital content distribution including an a) IPTV service without 
commercials but which charged $2 for TV programs and $4 for movies; b) a similar 
IPTV service which was free but included advertising; c) a 4
th network available on 
digital receivers only; d) a mobile phone platform charging $2 for TV programs and 
$4 for movies; e) a similar mobile platform which was free but included advertising; 
f) a limited subscription TV system available using their existing TV aerial; and 
finally g) an interactive datacasting channel.  Respondents were provided with 
descriptions of each of the above scenarios and selected their response using a 7 point 
semantic differential scale from highly unlikely to highly likely.  Figure (2) illustrates 
the weighted means of respondents based on our preliminary data. 
 
 
 
Figure (2): Weighted means reflecting likelihood of adoption of various digital 
scenarios. 
 
As can be seen from the available data, the most compelling consumer drivers are 
multichannelling, IPTV (whether for free content with ads or for paid content) and the 
availability of a digital only 4
th network.  None of the other options, including mobile 
video or datacasting, reflected positive consumer sentiment.   
 
We divided our respondents into nine cells based on whether they had adopted digital 
receivers (further divided by high vs. standard definition receivers) and whether they 
                                                 
12   Loncar, T, Fairbrother, P and Daiziel, J. (2005).  Digital Media in Australian Homes.  Australian 
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were pay TV subscribers (or if not, whether they were likely to be in the next five 
years). This allowed us to explore the potential impact of these various scenarios on 
different consumer cohorts.  Figure (3) provides a summary of means across the 
various sub-cells.  Again, as the research is still in progress, it is not possible to draw 
definitive conclusions.  Based on our existing data, however, some preliminary 
observations can be made. 
 
 
Figure (3): Table of means for adoption across the different digital scenarios broken 
down by pay TV subscription and digital TV receiver adoption (based on preliminary 
data). 
 
The strongest responses to the adoption of IPTV services come from those who have 
not yet subscribed to a pay TV service but consider themselves likely to do so over 
the next five years and who have already adopted DTT receivers.  This suggests that 
the strongest impact of IPTV will be in potentially preventing this cohort from 
subscribing to an existing pay TV provider. 
 
An interesting trend also appears to be apparent with regard to the availability of a 4
th 
digital only FTA network.  Here, the impact associated with such a channel is 
marginal among existing pay TV subscribers but highest among those who consider 
themselves likely to subscribe in the next five years.  Notwithstanding this trend, 
however, even with the availability of a 4
th FTA network, this cohort still considers 
themselves likely to subscribe within the next five years (HD 5.25, SD 4.60, NR 
5.22).  
 
The pattern reflecting respondent enthusiasm for multichannelling is more evenly 
distributed reflecting positive sentiment across cells.  The Limited Pay TV scenario 
provided positive appeal to likely future pay TV subscribers alone, suggesting that the 
potential effect of such a service would concentrate most on likely pay TV subscribers 
(effectively competing with existing providers for growth). 
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In exploring the potential impact of the various digital scenarios on existing pay TV 
subscribers, the available evidence shows no negative impact threatening existing 
subscriptions.  It appears that existing subscribers perceive themselves as continuing 
in their loyalty despite the range of scenarios they were presented with. 
 
6. Optimal Trend 
As noted earlier, our Bass diffusion model predicts that there is a strong probability 
(other things being equal) that the existing digital adoption rate will meet a 2012 
analogue switch-off target if current trends continue.  In this context, the proposed 
reforms should further reinforce this trend. 
 
We believe that a number of the proposed  reforms should act to further stimulate the 
market.  The removal of the genre restrictions on the multichannelling restrictions 
imposed on national broadcasters and the removal of the high definition / standard 
definition simulcast (which, in effect, allows for an HD multichannel) provide the 
market with significant opportunities to access new content.   
 
We would have preferred to see specifics on the new rules associated with the 
datacasting regime.  There certainly has been no shortage of reviews exploring this 
landscape… it is not clear why such detail is lacking in the proposed policy 
framework.  Accordingly, it is not possible to predict which new players might 
emerge and what type of datacasting service they might offer.  Hence, datacasting 
represents an unknown ‘wildcard’ in the conversion strategy… until such detail is 
provided it will be difficult to evaluate. 
 
Under the optimal scenario, therefore, the current reforms may be sufficient to 
stimulate digital conversion in 2012. 
 
7. Moderate Intervention Trend 
Under a scenario where digital penetration is between 55% and 65% in mid-2008 (or 
below 80% by mid-2010), we recommend a moderate policy intervention.  The 
primary change in policy we envision under this scenario is the removal of 
multichannel restrictions on FTA broadcasters.  It is important to note that as the 
provision of such channels is optional (and not imposed on FTA broadcasters), there 
is a risk that it will not stimulate sufficient take up (in which case a more aggressive 
intervention may be required at the next two year review).  Other intervention 
measures may also be considered at this juncture. 
 
Broadcasters and the pay TV industry may argue that such competition (from a new 
‘digital only’ broadcaster or from multichanelling) would significantly hurt their 
business models.  As the Allen Consulting Group concludes with regards to such 
multichanneling: “… there is considerable scope to accommodate a reduction in 
industry-wide profitability before the operational viability of the industry at large is 
threatened.”
13  Likewise, the Allen Consulting Group report considers the argument 
that quality would diminish ‘unfounded’.
14  
                                                 
13   Allen Consulting Group (2004).  The Removal of Restrictions on Digital Multichanelling by Commercial 
Television Broadcasters: Potential Economic Impacts.  Report to the Department of Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts. 
14   ibid Submission of the Interactive Television Research Institute  Page 10 
 
 
At any rate, by introducing a trigger for the implementation of commercial FTA 
multichannelling provisions, there are incentives for those who oppose such policy to 
help champion take up (to prevent such a trigger being activated).   
 
8. Aggressive Intervention Trend 
We maintain that a more aggressive intervention becomes necessary if, by 2008, DTT 
penetration remains below 55%.  Our models predict that under this scenario, it will 
be unlikely that an analogue shut-down can be facilitated by 2012 necessitating 
further delay in bringing the simulcast period to a close.   
 
We believe that under these circumstances, in addition to the changes suggested in a 
moderate intervention, a 4
th ‘digital only’ FTA network should also be authorised as 
this will provide the best chance for stimulating take up (although multichannelling 
provides a more compelling proposition for consumers in our sample, the 
unpredictability of multichannelling activity by existing FTA networks makes this a 
less certain driver).  Other measures to boost take up might also be considered.   
 
9. Implications of Recommendations on Spectrum Planning 
The three scenario mechanism we advocate imposes unique demands on existing 
spectrum planning.  Assuming that the analysis of available spectrum conducted by 
the former Australian Broadcasting Authority is still relevant, most capital cities will 
only have capacity for two new digital channels.   
 
We recommend that one of these channels be released for datacasting services.  
Consistent with our previous submissions, we believe that a beauty pagent represents 
the best means of allocating this spectrum.  In this way, the task of differentiating a 
datacasting service from a FTA channel is left to aspirant datacasters (that such 
distinction is protected can then form a key consideration in the selection process). 
 
We also recommend that new legislation be enacted that enables this datacaster to 
emerge as a platform integrator so that it can potentially deploy a backchannel, EPG 
and interactive applications that can be integrated across all channels.  The lack of 
such platform integration, we believe, has retarded the evolution of digital interactive 
services in Australia.  Common carrier provisions may need to be imposed on such a 
platform integrator to ensure that all channels have access to such services on equal 
terms. 
 
As the intervention triggers may, potentially, necessitate the launching of a 4
th 
network, we recommend that spectrum for the second of these two available channels 
be held in reserve until 2008.  This provides the government with maximum 
flexibility.  Not only can it then evaluate whether take up trends require such a 
network, but it can also review the performance of the then existing datacasters to 
evaluate whether to release an additional datacasting channel. 
 
In those cities where more than two channels are available, we would recommend that 
additional datacasting services be allowed so as to maximise innovation in the market. 
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10. The Role of Digital Pay TV 
In other countries, digital pay TV platforms have played a key role in facilitating 
digital conversion.  Accordingly, statistics reflecting digital take up often aggregate 
DTT, digital satellite and digital cable take-up.  A key question which remains 
unresolved is whether such aggregation is appropriate in the Australian context. 
 
A key assumption in other markets is that if viewers can access FTA networks over a 
Pay TV platform then such viewers are no longer dependent upon their terrestrial 
FTA broadcast system.  As Australia has no ‘must-carry’ provisions for FTA signals 
over Pay platforms, it cannot inherently be assumed that digital Pay platforms provide 
appropriate substitution.  Of course, such ‘must-carry’ provisions don’t have to trigger 
immediately… it is reasonable to argue that until switch-off is facilitated such a 
provision doesn’t inherently have to feature as a part of the digital conversion 
strategy.  But if the Government wishes to include digitisation across Pay TV 
platforms as part of its overall ‘take up’ strategy, it must provide a mechanism 
ensuring that the FTA signals are available at the time of digital switch over.   
 
Given that other facets of provisions for the end of the simulcast period are outlined in 
the discussion paper, we would maintain that such ‘must-carry’ provisions should also 
be included.  Alternatively, such Pay TV numbers should not be included in 
aggregated estimates of digital take up as they have no direct bearing on analogue 
switch off.  
 
11. The Digital Action Agenda 
We were delighted to see a proposed ‘Digital Action Agenda’ feature as a central 
component of the proposed framework.  We believe this constitutes an important part 
of any strategy moving forward.  However, the ‘real’ impact of such an agenda 
depends heavily on the extent to which such a body is given clear mandate and on the 
degree to which its views are respected within the industry (necessitating a high 
profile leaders group).  We believe that it is critical that the composition of such a 
leaders group draws from across the full value chain of the evolving industry 
representing at least the interests of broadcasters (both commercial and national), 
consumers, new prospective players, manufacturers (importers/retailers), advertisers 
and content producers.   
 
12. Consumer Research as an Integral Part of the Action Agenda 
The first Digital Action Agenda in 1999 (‘Thinking Outside the Box’) highlighted 
both technological and consumer drivers in its strategy for digital conversion.  
Although technical matters soon consumed deliberations associated with 
implementing digital strategy, consumer issues were largely neglected.  For most of 
the past nine years, there has been little quality research designed to help provide 
empirical analysis of emerging trends. ACMA’s recent digital survey represents a 
refreshing development in this regard. 
 
We believe the articulation of a research agenda which clearly lays out key questions 
which should form a central part of the Digital Action Agenda. Such research not only 
helps better inform evolving policy, but it provides for a better foundation through 
which to facilitate dialog with key stakeholders.  We are happy to assist in facilitating 
the development of such a research agenda as part of the wider Digital Action 
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13. Quality of Digital Service 
We have focused most of our comments in this submission on the take up of digital 
television receivers.  While the proposed policy may ultimately prove its capacity to 
stimulate digital take up even further, it is also important to comment on the 
qualitative character of Australia’s digital service. 
 
For the most part, the proposed policy framework seems likely to produce a digital 
market with minimal innovation (primarily limited to ‘zapping’ boxes).  Accordingly, 
this will help transplant television’s existing paradigm with minimal disruption.  
However, the structure of the global market is changing dramatically.  The lack of 
mandatory standards and a common integrated platform significantly constrain the 
capacity for our market to introduce many of the most exciting features made possible 
through the digital revolution.   
 
This represents a ‘lost opportunity’ moving forward. To some extent, the changes 
we’ve suggested help alleviate this problem in part – by creating an integrated 
platform, for example, enabling interactivity.  Our primary concern in this regard is 
that the lack of such innovation in the Australian FTA environment will insulate 
Australian content producers from the very significant changes that are taking place 
throughout Europe and the United States.  This will directly challenge our cultural 
exports which will, in turn, gradually erode the local cultural industries who depend 
on occasional exports to underwrite investment in the domestic sector. 
 
13. Conclusion 
Throughout the past five years, we have been strong critics of the Government’s 
digital television strategy.  We approached this review sceptical of its viability.  
Following a more detailed review of the “Meeting the Digital Challenge” framework 
accompanied by our own analysis of market trends and consumer sentiment, we now 
believe the proposed policy objectives are achievable within the newly proposed 
timeframe.  We strongly suggest, however, that mechanisms be introduced which act 
to intervene in the event that the consumer take up falls short of the necessary 
adoption rate to facilitate conversion.  As we have demonstrated, more conclusive 
evidence of this diffusion pattern should be available by 2008. 
 
Assuming a 2012 analogue-digital switchover, this currently positions us at Year 9 of 
a 15 year roll out.  In other words, we have come almost two-thirds of the journey. 
The Australian digital TV experience to date has been difficult.  In all likelihood, the 
path ahead will be no easier.   
 
We are now confident, however, that with good policy implementation and a flexible 
approach to the path ahead, an end to the simulcast period can be achieved by 2012.   
 
We welcome the opportunity to provide the Department with any additional 
information we can which might further assist it in its attempts to craft a path moving 
forward.  Please feel free to contact our director, Professor Duane Varan, at 
varan@itri.tv if we can be of any further service. 
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Background 
The Interactive Television Research Institute is an independent non-profit 
interdisciplinary research centre based at Murdoch University in Perth, Western 
Australia.  Our clients and research partners are global in character and include many 
of the world’s leading advertising brands and media platforms.  In the United States, 
for example, our advertising clients account for over one third of the US TV 
advertising spend. Many now view the Institute as providing one of the world’s 
leading research centre’s in study of viewing behaviour associated with the evolving 
digital television industry. 
 
Despite our global focus, we have maintained an active research agenda on issues 
specific to the Australian market.  Currently, for example, we are in the final stages of 
a three year project exploring how pre-school aged children respond to interactive 
television applications.  This ARC funded project (in collaboration with the WA 
Department of Education, the ABC, Nickelodeon and the Nine Network) has seen 
almost 500 children participate in research conducted in our Portable Audience 
Research Centre (PARC) – a portable lab housed in a caravan which visited 21 
schools.  We have also engaged in a wide range of studies exploring consumer 
responses to a wide range of digital TV applications.  In terms of issues associated 
with Australia’s digital policy, we remain active participants and have engaged in a 
number of policy studies – indeed, the ‘beauty pagent’ datacasting option put forth by 
the Australian Democrats was based, in part, on our submission to the Datacasting 
Review. 
 
The Institute’s research facilities provide dedicated infrastructure for the study of 
interactive television viewing.  Our labs on the Murdoch campus provides mock 
living rooms simulating the in-home experience of viewers.  In this environment we 
test digital TV content – usually using research methods reflecting experimental 
design so as to compare linear and interactive approaches in a controlled environment 
where variables can be properly isolated.  This includes a reference digital head end 
designed to modulate across satellite, cable and terrestrial platforms; and advanced 
audience measurement tools including eye gaze monitoring (mapping viewer eye 
movement over the TV screen) and perception analysers to map viewer’s moment-by-
moment perceptions. 
 
Given the many submissions the Committee will undoubtedly face on this issue, we 
will keep our comments short.  We are happy to expand upon any of the issues noted 
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Committee so wishes.  Likewise, the Institute’s Director, Professor Duane Varan, is 
happy to testify directly to the Inquiry if it please the Committee. 
 
Australia’s Digital TV Roll Out 
There is no question that television market’s globally have experienced a range of 
challenges associated with the roll out of terrestrial digital TV platforms.  Given the 
wide range of parties which are integral to effectively facilitating this transition and 
the inherent technical complexities associated with the technologies, this is 
understandable.  Indeed, we believe it represents the single biggest challenge facing 
the broadcast industry since its inception – significantly more complex, for example, 
than the transition to colour.   
 
In some regards, Australia’s policy to date has been successful on a number of levels.  
The necessary transmission infrastructure, at least for most of the capital cities, is 
largely in place.  Australia’s decision to adopt the DVB digital standard (as opposed, 
for example to the ATSC standard which could have been adopted given the high 
definition character of Australia’s roll out) has proven itself, by global measures, to 
have been the best available option.  There are now a wide range of digital TV 
receivers in the market, by some estimates in excess of 10% of households – and these 
are available at relatively low cost.  This is further supported by regular promotional 
campaigns supported by broadcasters informing viewers of the potential benefits 
associated with digital television.  These achievements should not be discounted.   
 
Despite these gains, however, Australia’s digital policy has not lived up to its 
potential.  Indeed, we believe that on many levels (these will be elaborated on), the 
policy is failing to live up to its obligations.  Our view is that the policy is falling 
short in significant measure and will not – on its current trajectory – advance 
Parliament’s intention to shut down analog TV in the foreseeable future.  It is also our 
view that the failure is not a primary function of market factors, per se, but is a direct 
result of poor policy.  Our policy concerns and their potential impact on the market 
will be addressed in specific terms in this submission. 
 
A Policy Protecting the Status Quo 
As noted earlier, crafting an effective policy facilitating digital migration is no easy 
feat.  Not only are there a wide range of technical issues to navigate through, but there 
are a wide range of market actors whose participation is critical to the effective 
implementation of television’s new value chain.  Beyond technical considerations, 
there are also a wide range of commercial considerations essential to making any 
approach sustainable.  The guiding principles for policy are also often ambiguous as 
the prevailing principles of the past (e.g. spectrum scarcity) don’t quite fit the new 
landscape.  And it is always difficult to anticipate consumer demand in advance – 
requiring planning for a future that hasn’t yet arrived.   
 
It’s clear that any transition strategy would have its own challenges.  What is 
problematic about the approach in Australia is not that digital migration is complex… 
it’s that the process has so clearly shifted from its original stated objectives.  Rather 
than usher in a new age – the policy is attempting to replicate the analog paradigm in 
a digital universe. The situation is less a reflection of the original legislative intent… 
rather, it has resulted from the manner in which the policy has been implemented. 
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At every juncture, the policy has navigated a path forward by making ad hoc 
concessions designed to appease particular segments of the television industry.  What 
has been cobbled together is a ‘lose-lose’ montage - penalising one market actor to 
compensate for the fact that another has been disadvantaged in some way.  It is a path 
forward whose premise is based on mutual disadvantage.  Rather than maximise the 
capacity to respond to audience demand (critical in navigating into an uncertain 
future), the policy inhibits market innovation and chills investment.   
 
This situation cultivates an environment where the only clear ‘win’ is associated with 
preservation of the status-quo.  In other words, the policy framework effectively is 
designed (whether or not by intent) to migrate the existing paradigm of television – 
complete with its existing value chain and players – across to digital with minimal 
disruption. This approach is problematic on three levels.  First, it fails to capitalise on 
the many advantages which digital affords.  Second, as a result, there is less incentive 
for consumers to adopt – significantly delaying analog shut off (thereby maximising 
spectrum efficiency).  Third, it fails to stimulate market adaptation in the television 
sector – which will be critical to preserving Australia’s capacity to maintain strong 
cultural industries going into the future (this theme will be elaborated on later in the 
submission). 
 
It is important, therefore, to question what the intent of the digital migration 
legislation is.  If it is simply to move the existing broadcasters from analog to digital 
and preserve television’s existing paradigm, then the best path forward would be to 
adopt a plan similar to the FCC in the United States and require digital tuners in all 
TV sets by a particular target date.  Over the course of 15 years, a migration would 
naturally be facilitated.  The current policy framework serves this direction well… in 
this environment the transition process is relatively straightforward and simple.  The 
relative cost of this to consumers would also be minimal as television production 
globally has largely been commoditised – resulting in significant downward pressure 
on price which, in effect, absorbs perceived negative consumer sentiment (as costs 
appear to remain stable, in relative terms). 
 
If, however, Australia is to benefit from the full range of benefits enabled by digital 
and if the Australian market is to adapt to global change in this arena, a more 
sophisticated policy is required.  At this level, Australia’s policy falls short.  
Specifically, we raise concerns with regards to the following: 
 
Datacasting 
Perhaps the single area where the policy has most visibly failed has been in the 
inability to effectively introduce datacasting in Australia’s digital television 
landscape.  The failure of the datacasting auctions was a clear indictment on the 
market’s rejection of the specific model of datacasting put forth by the 
Government. 
 
Australia’s datacasting regime is a classic textbook example of poor digital 
television policy.  In fact, we would assert that, taken in isolation (independent of 
the rest of Australia’s digital policy),  it is the single worst digital policy 
implemented in any national digital transition strategy globally.  The idea that a 
legal standard could possibly be based on subjective differentiation between 
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What is even more remarkable, however, is that faced with clear evidence that the 
standard was non-viable (following the collapse of the auction), the Government 
chose to continue to adhere to the standard rather than attempt to adapt it to 
respond to the market. This, we believe, constitutes a fundamental flaw in the 
digital framework as a whole.  It is also a reflection of the process through which 
the policy is being implemented; highlighting its inability to adapt to market 
demand. 
 
The original legislation crafted an environment where datacasting was introduced 
as a vital stimulant to accelerate digital adoption by consumers.  The datacasting 
fiasco has, in effect, left a void in what was supposed to be one of the critical 
drivers.  This, we believe, is the single biggest failure of the policy to date. 
   
Competition Implications 
A key feature of the digital legislation was a degree of ‘competitive tension’ 
designed to balance the interests of incumbent and new television players.  This 
recognised, we believe, that incumbents would best be motivated to facilitate the 
transition where there was competition in the character of the digital service 
itself.  It also responded to on-going pressure to diversify media control in 
Australia. 
 
The datacasting fiasco has resulted in an environment where there is no 
competition within the terrestrial digital platform.  In this context, key decisions 
reflecting the character of the platform and its key features are left to incumbents 
alone – who have minimal incentive to facilitate change.  This suggests that, 
others things being equal, the path moving forward will continue to reflect 
minimal change – retarding the introduction of the full range of possibilities 
enabled by digital and thereby slowing digital take-up. 
 
At a level of principle, there are also serious questions here about the degree to 
which the policy is inhibiting diversity of voice in Australia’s television 
landscape.  The existing situation, dominated by three commercial networks, has 
been justified in Australia on the basis of spectrum scarcity.  A good part of that 
scarcity has been further replicated by the decision to adopt high definition 
television.  However, the legislation allowed for competition – and the spectrum 
required to deliver against this was identified.  The failure to introduce such 
competition is, therefore, a further reflection of the failure of the policy to 
diversify Australia’s television sector. 
 
Interactive Services 
While the digitisation of television enables better sound and picture, it also 
enables a wide range of interactive services.  This includes enhancements to 
television programming as well as stand-alone applications.  Our research has 
consistently demonstrated that such interactivity can significantly enhance the 
viewing experience.  Such services also introduce new business models. 
 
In research exploring the impact of interactive advertising, for example, we have 
demonstrated that interactive ads deliver impact equal to seeing a linear ad 
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significant opportunity as attracting repeat exposure gets more and more 
challenging in a fragmented audience viewing environment.  This helps explain 
why, for example, advertisers in the UK have so enthusiastically adopted 
interactive ads despite the cost premium associated with such advertising. 
 
Potential new revenue streams are particularly important for broadcasters because 
the economics associated with television are shifting from ‘economies of scale’ to 
‘economies of scope’.  In other words, increasingly in the future, a broadcaster’s 
profits will be made based on their capacity to leverage their content assets across 
platforms rather than on the basis of the size of the audience on any single 
platform at any single point in time.  In this context, a key challenge for 
broadcasters is to diversify revenue streams – breaking the almost exclusive 
dependency they currently maintain on a single model of advertising (the 30 
second commercial). 
 
Interactivity, therefore, is critical to embracing television’s new business models.  
But by its very nature, such interactivity is disruptive to the existing business 
practise.  In this context, other things being equal, broadcasters have more 
invested in the status quo than in change. 
 
The advent of the Personal Video Recorder ultimately forces this transition in the 
market as the existing 30 second commercial model rapidly erodes outside of 
those programming opportunities still able to reproduce critical mass.  
Advertisers, therefore, are keen to explore new advertising models based on 
viewer ‘engagement’ rather than viewer ‘exposure’ alone.  In time, we believe, a 
fundamental shift occurs – and this will increasingly require a capacity to 
facilitate interactive content. 
 
While it is not the role of Government to ‘pick winners’, the issues associated 
with the lack of interactivity in the current broadcast landscape reflect policy 
decisions – rather than market forces.  By inhibiting datacasting, for example, a 
critical stimulant for interactive services has been lacking. Ultimately, the failure 
for Australia’s digital policy to effectively cultivate interactive services is another 
example of selling consumer’s short on the digital proposition. 
 
Backchannel and Integrated Platforms 
A wide range of interactive services reflecting digital’s promise require a 
backchannel facilitating two way interaction with the viewing audience.  This has 
implications for both receiver standards (to be discussed separately) and a 
significant investment in the back-end technology necessary to facilitate such 
transactions. 
 
The situation in Australia is such that a backchannel of any meaningful kind is 
difficult to evolve given the fragmented nature of the platform.  As each 
broadcaster is in complete control of their own spectrum, it is not possible to 
create a single unified system optimising the experience for viewers. 
 
For example, if a viewer watched an interactive ad on the Seven network and 
chose to interact – and then switched to channel Nine and chose to interact again 
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frontchannel interaction) – this would require two separate calls.  For advertisers, 
this could also mean having to deliver to two different requirements and 
potentially paying additional premiums for access across two platforms.   
 
Although there have been parties interested in exploring commercial models 
based on distributing free or subsidised set top box receivers in return for 
facilitation of the platform, the inability to aggregate across interactive services 
on the platform significantly chills investment in this regard. 
 
In the UK, by way of contrast, regulators have separated the platform and 
individual channels across that platform.  Although Freeview hasn’t yet 
attempted to exploit a backchannel (though it has the capacity to do this), this 
disaggregation of channel and platform enables a wide range of services which 
make the platform, as a whole, a significantly more attractive proposition for 
viewers.  For example, an EPG sitting across the platform provides a more 
integrated and fulfilling experience for the viewer than the Australian approach of 
having separate EPG’s for each channel. 
 
Again, the issue is not to mandate any particular market response… but to 
facilitate the provision of an integrated platform capable of responding to a wide 
range of commercial opportunities associated with the backchannel.  Australia’s 
existing policy framework largely inhibits the cultivation of such a platform. 
 
Receiver Standards 
Although Australia has over-regulated many aspects of the industry, we believe it 
has under-regulated questions associated with standards.  On one level, this 
creates a chaotic environment with a large range of devices sold in the market 
with no assurance that they meet minimum standards. 
 
When the digital proposition is limited to ‘zapping boxes’ – as is currently the 
case – this introduces a minimal risk to the market.  Primarily this risk is 
associated with a loss of consumer confidence in digital due to poor performance 
of digital receivers.  However, as more sophisticated receivers are introduced 
following the provision of more advanced digital services this creates a chaotic 
environment as all providers are held to the lowest common denominator.  This, 
in practise, further compromises the digital proposition for viewers. 
 
Mandating digital standards and developing a compliance scheme should be an 
integral feature in Australia’s digital policy framework. 
 
Role of National Broadcasters 
It is clear that the provision of either enhanced or additional content is a key 
driver for digital uptake.  The experience in the UK demonstrates that when 
digital penetration is low, channels have little incentive to provide such content.  
But as digital adoption approaches a critical threshold (let’s assume this begins to 
become significant at 33% penetration), channels begin having incentive to make 
such content available. 
 
So a key question is how new content features as part of the digital proposition 
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egg question.  New content drives uptake.  But critical scale is required to provide 
the necessary incentive to get content in the first place. 
 
In the UK, the national broadcaster (the BBC) has fulfilled this role.  The 
provision of the BBC’s digital content (both its additional channels and its 
interactive enhancements) have clearly stimulated digital adoption – indeed, in 
terrestrial space it is probably the main market driver.  This has also played a 
significant role in ‘training’ viewers for the new interactive landscape. 
 
In Australia, however, national broadcasters have largely been inhibited from 
driving such innovation – not only through limited budgeting but, perhaps more 
importantly, through legislation barring them from providing specific content 
genres across their new services.  Although a second ABC channel is back on air 
(and there is good evidence that this is stimulating digital adoption), the policy 
has largely failed to facilitate an active role for national broadcasters in 
pioneering innovation in the digital market. This is not due to a lack of desire, on 
the part of the national broadcasters, to fulfil such a role.  Rather, it is a result of 
the policy framework itself. 
 
Policy Rationale 
The concerns we voice highlight the degree to which – at a level of principle – the 
overall objectives associated with the policy remain unclear.  Where these principles 
are clearly articulated, the implementation of policy tends to better steer the transition 
process. 
 
In other markets the policy rationales are clear.  In the US, for example, digital 
migration is driven primarily by spectrum scarcity.  In the UK, competition policy has 
largely driven the digital conversion agenda.  In South Korea, digital policy has 
responded to market opportunities associated with the export of television production 
and reception equipment building a base through which to strengthen local industry.  
What drives policy in Australia? 
 
Here the issues of spectrum scarcity, with some notable exceptions, are for the most 
part not a driving force.  For most of Australia, there is no where near the type of 
scarcity that is driving change in the American or European markets.  Australia also 
has a limited electronics equipment manufacturing industry – so this seems an 
unlikely rationale.  Although there are significant competition issues in Australia, the 
chaotic approach to digital here hardly reflects any type of consistent or coherent 
competition framework.  In this sense, digital conversion policy lacks a compelling 
driving principle. 
 
We would suggest that the main driver for change in Australia should be the need to 
harmonize the television industry to fundamental change taking place in globally.  
This, we believe, is important in helping provide a buffer for this transition and in 
protecting Australia’s cultural exports (which in turn has a profound effect on our 
own domestic television production capacity). 
 
In terms of buffering change… there is no question that the landscape associated with 
the structure of the television market is in a period of unparalleled change.  We can 
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wishes.  In brief, each of the fundamental pillars associated with broadcasting’s 
golden triangle (delivering mutual value to channels, advertisers and viewers) is 
experiencing significant disruption.  The relationship between viewer and advertising 
is disrupted by technologies empowering viewers to avoid ads; advertising and 
channel relationships are being challenged by increasing demand for accountability 
(reflecting a shift from above to below the line media); and the relationship between 
channel and viewer is being transformed by growing audience fragmentation (this 
trend has not yet impacted Australia due to low pay-TV take up).   
 
A range of technologies are further accelerating the process of market disruption 
because of their capacity to operate outside the parameters of this golden triangle.  
IPTV (television delivered over broadband) transcends national borders – accelerating 
fragmentation (particularly among key viewing cohorts).  PVR’s disrupt ad models – 
particular where there is measurement of its time-shifting character (as will be the 
case in the United States in early 2006).  There will be indirect effects associated with 
the transition as well.  For example, the pace of change associated with the PVR 
market will probably be much more rapid in the United States than here in Australia.  
Even though the shift plays out on distant shores, it will impact the media planning 
strategies of the global brands – which account for almost half of the Australian TV 
ad spend.  Hence, even before the effects have fully played out in Australia, they will 
begin impacting the structure of the market. 
 
Although it is reasonable to argue that broadcasters should be left to their own device 
to adapt to this shifting landscape, the implications associated with this transition do 
not limit the potential fallout to broadcasters alone.  Australia’s cultural and 
advertising industries are also put at risk.  Hence, decisions by one segment of the 
market (broadcasters) are currently shaping the capacity of other vital segments (e.g. 
content producers) to respond to such fundamental market change. 
 
It is also important to note the degree to which Australia’s success in the export of 
cultural products are put at risk.  Australia’s television exports transcend it relative 
market scale.  Such exports have been instrumental in lifting the quality of Australian 
television content as a whole – because the few sparks of success bring with them 
windfalls that underwrite significant losses enabling significant investment in 
television production. 
 
However, as Australia insulates itself from changes playing out in other regions – 
particularly in the US and European markets – its capacity to effectively export to 
these markets diminishes over time.  This in turn erodes the quality of Australia’s 
domestic television content sector as well.  The negative fallout of all this is further 
impacted by the increasing availability of international content (distributed through 
IPTV), further diminishing Australia’s cultural industrial capacity. 
 
Currently, Australia’s digital conversion strategy has minimal (if any) consideration 
for such factors.  There is, for example, no provision in the content quota scheme 
rewarding the significant risk associated with interactive television content.  We 
believe that articulating the need to develop a competitive digital television content 
sector provides a meaningful principle (among others) to help shape Australia’s 
digital conversion strategy. 
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Consumer Incentive 
It is our view that the interest of consumers has not been a driving factor in facilitating 
the conversion to digital.  While better sound and picture provide some level of 
incentive, there are clear consumer drivers which are specifically inhibited by 
Australia’s digital conversion policy. 
 
We’ve attached a copy of a survey we conducted on behalf of the Australian 
Broadcasting Authority (see attachment ‘B’).  This survey attempted to get a snap 
shot of the views of those directly engaged in the digital television sector.  At the 
time, we managed to solicit the views of approximately one third of those in the 
industry who had any direct experience with digital.  In many ways, this reflects a 
candid view of these opinions.  Given the exposure the study received following it’s 
distribution, it is unlikely that those surveyed would again be so candid in sharing 
their views.   
 
What stands out in the ABA survey is the degree to which the opportunities which 
those in the industry believe consumers will respond best to (such as multicasting) are 
the very drivers inhibited by policy.  The converse is also apparent… the policy’s key 
drivers – such as high definition – are seen as providing the least incentive.  This 
highlights the degree to which even those in the industry itself see a discrepancy 
between the services they provide and those they believe consumers are most 
interested in. 
 
Rather than engage in a debate about what the best driver might be, the best approach 
(given that spectrum has already been allocated for high definition) is to allow market 
forces to decide.  This is not possible, however, if key market opportunities are 
denied.  The best approach for consumers, it would appear, would be one maximising 
flexibility – so that broadcasters and datacasters were free to compete using a variety 
of drivers to test which consumers respond to best. 
 
Future Options 
On the basis of this discussion, the Institute would make the following 
recommendations to help accelerate digital conversion: 
 
1.  Digital Television Standards 
As noted above, there is a need for a government process designed to mandate 
specific parameters of the digital conversion process.  This does not have to be 
extensive and span all aspects of the industry – but it must ensure that a 
minimum technical standard (particularly at the level of set top box) is met.  
This is not about a single issue (e.g. MHP) – it reflects an on-going need to 
adapt to constantly changing market forces.  Although allowing industry itself 
to self-regulate is an option, there is no forum which facilitates this from a 
position of true competitive neutrality.  Also, self-regulation has demonstrated, 
over the past few years, that it moves at a snail’s pace, a position inconsistent 
with the ambitions of accelerated digital conversion. 
 
2.  Digital Television Commission 
In the UK there were significant market advances following the demise of ITV 
Digital resulting in the articulation of the Digital TV Action Plan.  This 
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industry representatives.  We believe that Australia would benefit from the 
creation of an entity given explicit mandate over digital conversion in a forum 
facilitating close interaction with industry.  Naturally, such a group should 
reflect the diversity of market agents central to any effective transition 
including broadcasters, datacasters, equipment manufacturers, advertisers, 
policymakers and academics. 
 
3.  Datacasting Channels 
We recommend the introduction of two datacasting channels, whose scope 
would be mandated as follows: 
a.  Platform channel 
As noted earlier, in the UK the Government withstood significant 
incumbent pressure and separated the platform from its various channels.  
This has resulted in an integrated channel (Freeview) capable of presenting 
viewers with a superior digital proposition.  By way of contrast, the 
American approach (similar to Australia’s) of awarding licenses 
individually provides no coherent integrated platform framework. 
 
We recommend a hybrid approach allowing individual channels full 
control over their spectrum, but also enabling the creating of a datacasting 
channel to provide integrated services across the platform.  This would 
provide clear market incentive for an emerging market actor to invest in 
significant backchannel infrastructure.  It might also provide for new 
distribution models based on maximising distribution of appropriately 
enabled set top boxes. 
 
The front end of this channel should be an Electronic Program Guide 
designed to facilitate an integrated viewing experience for viewers.  
Access to data associated with this guide may be an issue requiring further 
legal specification.  Similarly, provisions associated with fair royalties to 
platform channels (the cost of ‘clipping the ticket’) may need to be 
specified so as to enable interactive transactions through use of the 
platform. 
 
We are keen to assist the Committee in further exploring this option, if it is 
of interest to the Committee.  We believe it will attract significant 
investment, provide a more cohesive digital terrestrial platform and 
accelerate adoption by viewers.   
 
b.  Digital channel 
We would recommend that the second channel be allocated for the 
provision of a 4
th commercial TV network – limited to digital spectrum 
alone.  We would recommend no artificial constraints be imposed on the 
provision of this channel (i.e. datacasting inhibitions), but rather suggest 
that by limiting its availability to digital alone there is sufficient market 
incentive for the channel to help stimulate digital take up. 
 
4.  Flexible Spectrum Usage 
As noted earlier, we believe that digital take up is maximised by ‘win-win’ 
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creating mutual disadvantage for all, we believe an effective policy must 
stimulate the market with clear incentives for all. 
 
Accordingly, we recommending removing most of the current restrictions and 
allow the market to itself decide which factors best contribute to digital take 
up.  We would encourage continuation with high definition – but allowing 
broadcasters the flexibility to use their spectrum for multiple channels, 
enhancement or other television applications.  We would encourage the 
removal of datacasting restrictions and have provided you with our views as to 
how the spectrum might best be used.  We would also recommend re-visiting a 
range of prohibitions imposed on the pay-TV sector as the removal of many of 
the digital restrictions directly impacts them without providing them with new 
opportunities moving forward.  This may require a separate inquiry. 
 
The principle we advocate here is one of maximum market flexibility so as to 
allow the market to better identify potential opportunities.  However, we 
caution that without the introduction of new players, who are  not invested in 
the current television paradigm in Australia, the necessary competitive tension 
may be lacking to fully exploit such opportunity. 
 
Conclusion 
As a non-profit independent research centre based in Australia, the Interactive 
Television Research Institute is keen to assist, in whatever way it can, the needs of the 
Committee.  We believe that the current review plays an important role in shaping the 
very structure of Australia’s television landscape for decades to come.  We are happy 
to provide the Committee with any further research or background information 
available to us (subject to our own Confidentiality constraints).  Likewise, as noted 
earlier, our Director would be please to testify at the Inquiry if it please the 
Committee.   
 
We wish the Committee well in its deliberations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 